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Abstract
Capability passing processes model global applications in a way that decouples the global agreement aspects of protocols
from the details of how the communications are actually made. It relies on a restricted API or programming language and on the
exchange of digital certificates representing capabilities to ensure that participants are faithful to a protocol and that outsiders
cannot interfere. At the specification level, protocols are reasoned about independently of the underlying communication, using a
process calculus with an abstraction of logs to isolate the remote state required for such protocols. At the implementation level,
protocol steps no longer perform global communication; instead capabilities are used to transmit evidence of remote state, which
in turn are used to authorize local log changes (corresponding to protocol steps). In this way, an API for global agreement protocols
is defined independently of the underlying communication system.
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1. Introduction
Global distributed applications must deal with the fact that the Internet, and other networks, are increasingly
becoming discrete address spaces, delineated by firewalls, network address translation, independent failures etc.
Fig. 1(a) describes the most common communication framework for distributed computing; the typical protocol stack
includes a network layer for routing, a transport layer for reliable communication, and an application layer. The lower
layers of this stack are complicated by the increasing sophistication of the network environment [1], leading to code
bloat and increasing complexity of these layers due to the need to respond to these additional demands [2]. This in
turn violates the well-known end-to-end argument in system design that for examples underlies the Internet protocol
stack [3].
We propose a system in which, instead of the protocol primitives communicating directly, processes pass proofs of
their capabilities between each other. Rather than assume that parties in a protocol have point-to-point communication
channels between each other, we decouple the details of party-to-party protocols from the details of how those parties
communicate. The parties exchange “evidence” of their internal state. This evidence takes the form of capabilities
that allow parties to update their internal state, according to agreed-upon application-specific global protocols. For
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Fig. 1. Structuring protocol layers in global computing.
example, in a two-phase commit protocol described later in the article, participants in the protocol rely on evidence
from the administrator of the protocol before they can enter the “committed” state.
There are two key advantages to this approach. The first is that the user can control how these capabilities are
passed between sites, and so navigate any particular network obstacles that the protocol system may not be aware of,
such as NAT, VPNs, faulty connections, disconnected nodes etc. The second is that by separating the agreement parts
of a protocol from the communication aspects we can model both separately.
Our approach is motivated by the fact that any kind of global application will require the design and implementation
of protocols for some forms of distributed agreement. Although distributed consensus is in general unsolvable in
asynchronous distributed systems [4,5], certain environments may be amenable to assumptions of partial synchrony,
and it is possible for some applications to define a notion of agreement that trades off accuracy for performance. This
mediates against building any kind of distributed agreement into the semantics of any language for global applications.
Instead we focus on a language for such applications that provides support for designing and implementing protocols
for distributed agreement. An implementation of any global agreement protocol will require the ability to deliver
messages to different sites. The approach of inserting a transaction layer above the transport layer, as depicted in
Fig. 1(b), again raises the problem of complicating a protocol layer with issues that belong to other layers or other
parts of the software system.
We advocate the approach depicted in Fig. 1(c), where we move the transaction layer into the application layer.
As before, the transaction layer is tasked with ensuring global state consistency conditions (e.g., money not being
withdrawn from one account without being deposited into another). The key change is that the transaction layer is de-
coupled from the navigation of the global environment. By separating this layer from the communication functionality,
we reduce the size of the trusted computing base required for maintaining global consistency and integrity.
Our approach amounts to a restricted API for changing the logs that represent the “durable” state of the parties in
a distributed system. The restricted API ensures that we only allow changes that preserve the integrity of the overall
system state. Rather than simply providing a single operation for appending to the log, we define a family of such
log-appending operations, each corresponding to a step in a global protocol that the parties are following. Each such
operation requires “evidence” of both local and remote parties’ state to ensure that the rules of the protocol are being
followed in the log-appending operations.
Complementary to this, the parties must be able to communicate evidence of their state to each other, in such a way
that outside parties cannot interfere and cause the system to enter an inconsistent state. While this could be looked at
as moving the problem from one place to another, we are in fact moving the problem of network communication out
of the transaction system and into the hands of the programmer. This moves the communication system away from a
“one size fits all” solution in the network layer and allows the programmer of a system, who will probably know their
target network the best, to decide how communication will take place. However, we retain the correctness guarantees
that would be provided by a transaction system that performed its own communication.
A simple example of the two-phase commit protocol in our calculus is described as follows (repeated in Fig. 6, and
explained more fully, in Section 3):
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Transi ≡ ci {logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtSubmit;
logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPrep;
( logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartCmt; stop
| logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartAbt; stop ) }
Admin Trans ≡ cadm{logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtAdmin;
( logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtAdmCmt; stop
| logappend 〈〉 with AtStAbort; stop ) }
System ≡ Admin Trans | Trans1 | Trans2 | cadm{{ε}} | c1{{ε}} | c2{{ε}}.
The details of the protocol are factored out into the operations for modifying the logs of the administrator and
the two participants (the logappend operation that the processes use). The details of how the parties in the protocol
communicate log state between each other is elided at the specification level, and filled in at the implementation level.
Correctness (safety) at the specification level then carries over to the implementation level.
To formulate our method of removing the need for global consensus we return to the lqp-calculus, which we have
previously proposed as a language for fault-tolerant global computing [6]. We review this work in Section 2. This
calculus extends the pi-calculus with logs and with actions that append new log entries and check the contents of logs.
In Section 4, we show a way of automatically extracting a capability passing version of this calculus, the lqcp-calculus,
which only makes local checks. Section 3 and Section 5 illustrate our system using the two-phase commit protocol as
an example. Section 6 considers how this approach can be realized as a Java API. Section 7 considers related work,
while Section 8 provides our conclusions. In Appendix, we relate “correctness” of the capability passing system (in
the lqcp-calculus) to correctness of the specification (in the lqp-calculus).
In earlier work [6], the authors introduced a specification-level calculus, the lqp-calculus, and considered
extended examples of modelling fault-tolerance protocols using the abstraction of logs, including transactions, causal
dependencies, and compensating transactions for long-lived applications. That work assumed a specification-level
facility for globally querying logs, including logs at remote sites. The current account introduces an implementation-
level calculus, the lqcp-calculus, where only local logs can be queried, and querying of remote logs requires the
exchange of “evidence” of log state. In previous work [7] we proposed an extension of Java with capability passing
processes. We discussed a strongly typed calculus as a base for this work but we did not give a type system, semantics
or a correctness result. An earlier version of the current work appeared in [8]. The current article provides a more
formal treatment of the process for appending logs; this in turn also precisely relates the log append preconditions
at the specification and the implementation levels. It also provides the statement and verification of several formal
properties of the calculi at the specification and implementation levels, relating the safety properties of a specification
to its implementation.
2. The lqp-calculus: Specifying protocols
The log-querying processes (lqp-)calculus is based on the asynchronous pi-calculus [9,10], a popular calculus
for reasoning about distributed programming languages. The syntax of the pi-calculus is shown in Fig. 2(a). These
calculus contains operations for sending and receiving messages on named channels; channel names n are globally
unique. The message receive operation is blocking, but the message send operation is not. In addition to these
constructs, there are also operations for generating new channel names, for replicating processes (this can be used
to define recursive processes) and for forming the parallel composition of processes.
Fig. 2(b) contains the extensions of the pi-calculus for the lqp-calculus. One of the innovations of the lqp-calculus
is to organize processes into process groups; we refer to these process groups as conclaves. A conclave has the form
c{P} where c is the name of a conclave and P is a process, which may itself be a parallel composition of a number
of other processes. The calculus has two levels; conclaves can only appear at the network level and the contents of a
conclave are a process. This arrangement forces each process in a network to belong to exactly one conclave: each
process exists in a network term of the form c{P} where c is the name of the conclave for that process.
The lqp-calculus adds two new operations to the pi-calculus: an operation for appending to the logs of a conclave,
and an operation for querying the logs of a conclave. The logappend rule for appending to logs is essentially a family
of named log append rules, each such named rule corresponding to a step in some application-specific protocol for
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P ∈ Processes ::= stop | (P1 | P2)
| send v1!v2 | receive v1?v2; P
| new n; P | repeat P
v ∈ Value ::= n, a, b, c, . . . | u, v, w, x, y, z . . .
| 〈v1, . . . , vk〉
(a) Syntax of the pi-calculus
P ∈ Processes ::= . . . As above
| logawait c{{Q(x)}}; P Query log
| logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name; P Add log entry
N ,C,M ∈ Network ::= c{P} Conclave
| c{{L}} Log
| new n; C Scoped name
| (C1 | C2) Composition
L ∈ Log Entry ::= ε | Q(v) | (L1 ∧ L2)
Q ∈ Predicate ::= . . .
(b) Extensions for the lqp-calculus
Fig. 2. The lqp-calculus.
global agreement. The parameters v represent the inputs to the log append, since each log append rule is parameterized
by some inputs. The logawait operation provides a pattern for a log entry, represented by a logical predicate and the
arguments to that predicate. This operation unblocks when such a log entry is present at the specified conclave, and
the variables in the pattern are instantiated with the actual parameters to the predicate in the log entry.
A network is composed of a process group (located at a conclave; the implementation calculus assumes the
processes in a conclave are at the same physical location, but it is also possible for several conclaves to reside at
the same location); a log for a conclave; a binder for a name; or the composition of two networks.
A log consists of a conjunction of zero or more logical propositions. The predicates for these propositions are
determined on an application-specific basis, and are used to represent the current state of a conclave in a run of a
protocol.
The structural equivalence rules are provided in Fig. 3. These are largely the standard structural equivalence rules
for the pi-calculus, replicated for networks. For example there is the usual scope extrusion rule:
(new n; P1) | P2 ≡ new n; (P1 | P2), n /∈ fn(P2).
The function fn returns the free names of a process or a network, i.e., the names that occur but are not bound by a
new operator. The renaming rules may be necessary to rename a local name before its scope is extruded out of the
parallel composition of processes or networks. There is also a structural equivalence rule for distributing conclaves
over parallel composition, c{P1 | P2} ≡ c{P1} | c{P2}.
The processes inside each conclave are active entities, and they can communicate with each other in the standard
pi-calculus way. The agreement aspects of a system are modelled by extending the pi-calculus with a notion of
logs. These logs are used to explicate the communication requirements of protocols, such as atomic commitment
protocols, without committing to how protocol messages should be delivered in global computing environments.
We only consider well-formed network in which each conclave c has a single log, of the form c{{L}}, where L is
a collection of log entries. Since logs cannot be created or destroyed, it is trivial to show that well-formedness is
preserved by reduction. A log entry has the form Q(v), denoting a log entry asserting the property Q concerning the
value v.
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c{stop} | N ≡ N stop | P ≡ P
N1 | N2 ≡ N2 | N1 P1 | P2 ≡ P2 | P1
(N1 | N2) | N3 ≡ N1 | (N2 | N3) (P1 | P2) | P3 ≡ P1 | (P2 | P3)
new n1; new n2; N ≡ new n2; new n1; N new n1; new n2; P ≡ new n2; new n1; P
new n; N ≡ N , n /∈ fn(N ) new n; P ≡ P, n /∈ fn(P)
c{new n; P} ≡ new n; c{P}, n 6= c c{P1 | P2} ≡ c{P1} | c{P2}
new n1; N ≡ new n2; N [n2/n1], n2 /∈ fn(N ) new n1; P ≡ new n2; P[n2/n1], n2 /∈ fn(P)
true ∧ L ≡ L L1 ∧ L2 ≡ L2 ∧ L1 (L1 ∧ L2) ∧ L3 ≡ L1 ∧ (L2 ∧ L3)
(new n; N1) | N2 ≡ new n; (N1 | N2), n /∈ fn(N2)
(new n; P1) | P2 ≡ new n; (P1 | P2), n /∈ fn(P2)
repeat P ≡ P | repeat P
Fig. 3. Equivalence rules for the lqp-calculus.
(c1{send n!v1} | c2{receive n?v2; P}) −→ c2{P[v1/v2]} (COM)
N ≡ E[N ′] N ′ −→ M ′ M ≡ E[N ]
N −→ M (CONG)
(a) The Base Semantics
c{logawait c0{{Q(x)}}; P} | c0{{L ∧ Q(v)}} −→
c{P[v/x]} | c0{{L ∧ Q(v)}} (LOGAWAIT)
(c{{L}} | N ), c |= (v) rule-name−−−−−→ Q(v0)
c{logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name; P} | c{{L}} | N −→
c{P} | c{{L ∧ Q(v0)}} | N
(LOGAPPEND)
(b) Non-Capability Passing Semantics
Fig. 4. The lqp-calculus.
The lqp-calculus’ semantics is given in Fig. 4. The first rule of the base semantics, (COM), allows any two conclaves
to communicate on a channel. We do not specify that the two conclaves are different, so this rule can be used for
internal communication.
The second base rule, (CONG), allows any other reduction to happen inside any unguarded network context E and
with any possible application of the equivalence rules. The context E is define as:
E[ · ] ::= [ · ] | E[ · | M ] | new n; E[ · ]
and E[N ] is the network formed by replacing the “hole” [ · ] in E with the network N .
The two constructs that allow interaction with logs are logawait and logappend. The logawait construct blocks
until a log entry for the conclave name and predicate symbol is in the stable storage represented by the logs, as given
by the (LOG AWAIT) rule in Fig. 4(b).
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The logappend construct is used by a conclave to add new log entries to its own log, as given by the (LOG
APPEND) rule in Fig. 4(b). It in turn uses one of a collection of named log rewrite rules. These rules define the
behaviour of the protocol being modelled, so we use different sets of rewrite rules for different protocols. An example
of such a log rewrite rule might check that a conclave is not already aborted before it commits. A log rewrite rule
can check for the presence of log entries in any conclave and may check for the absence of entries in its own log.
We disallow querying for the absence of remote log entries because of the race conditions that this would imply.
Any implementation that avoided such race conditions would require some form of distributed consensus, which is
impossible to implement without making some further assumptions about the network beyond basic asychrony [4,5].
Therefore we do not include remote negative checks as an atomic operation in our calculus. However, we do note that
a number of approximations to distributed consensus, and so to negative remote checks, can be implemented with
the existing calculus primitives. For example, two-phase commit could be used to implement negative remote checks,
although it would be slow and vulnerable to blocking with failures.
The rule for logappend given in Fig. 4 is used when a conclave c, which has the log L , uses the logappend action
with the log rewrite rule called rule-name. The log rewrite rule takes the parameters v and states that the predicate
Q(v0) should be added to the log. Each log rewrite rule requires some preconditions and adds a log entry to the local
log. These rules are specified using judgements of the form:
PC
NC, c |= (v) rule-name−−−−−→ Q(v0)
(RULE-NAME)
where rule-name is the name of the rule. The network condition NC must match with a network term provided by the
logappend rule. The network condition states which log entries must be present and may also bind some names and
log variables. The bound names and variables may have further conditions imposed on them by the precondition PC.
The name c is the name of the conclave executing the logappend action and hence it is also the name of the local
log. The values v are the parameters for the log rewrite rule (the name of the administrator conclave, for instance) and
Q(v0) is the log entry that this rule add to the log of c.
We specify the exact language of the preconditions so that we can formalize the removal of the remote checks from
these rules in Section 4. The network conditions can be specified as follows:
NC ∈ Network Condition ::= true
| c{{LC}}
| ( NC1 | NC2 )
LC ∈ Log Condition ::= Q(v)
| Lx
| LC1 ∧ LC2.
The simplest precondition is “true”, which matches any network term. The network condition c{{Q(v)}} requires
the provided network to be exactly c{{Q(v)}}. If we want to specify that certain log entries are present, as well as
others, we may use the network condition c{{Lx ∧ Q(v)}}, which requires that the log entry Q(v) is present and binds
the other entries to the variable Lx . The parallel composition ( NC1 | NC2 ) matches a network N if there exists N1
and N2 such that N ≡ N1 | N2 and NC1 matches N1 and NC2 matches N2. Examples of some of these conditions are
provided in the next section.
To express more complicated conditions on the logs we use the following logic:
PC ∈ Precondition ::= v1 = v2 | true
| PC1 ∧ PC2 | PC1 ∨ PC2
| v ∈ 〈v1, . . . , vn〉 | ∀x ∈ 〈v1, . . . , vn〉.PC
| Lx 6≡ LC.
The first precondition expresses equality between values, including tuples. We may also check if a value is a
member of a tuple and express a condition that holds for all values in a tuple. The Lx 6≡ LC allows us to check for the
absence of an entry in a log. It will be difficult to guarantee the absence of an entry from a remote log so we do not
allow remote negative checks as primitives. So whenever the precondition Lx 6≡ LC is used, the log variable Lx must
have been bound from the local log.
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Network conditions of the form c{{Q(v)}} require that only the log entry Q(v) is present and so in effect perform a
negative check on all other log entries. Therefore we also forbid these kinds of conditions on remote logs.
We can summarize the restriction on the kinds of check we can make by saying that a log rewrite rule is valid for
the lqp-calculus if:
(1) any negative test on a log is only applied to the local log, i.e., if there is a precondition of the form Lx 6≡ LC then
Lx is a log variable bound by the local log.
(2) network conditions on remote logs do not disallow any log entries from being present, i.e., any network condition
on a non-local log is of the form c0{{Lx ∧ LC}}, which allows other log entries in addition to the specific form of
the log entry being checked.
For some sets of log rewrite rules, the logappend and logawaitmay be the only actions that are needed in order to
model a protocol. But in the most general case the use of the send and receive actions together with the log actions
allows a network to behave in a much more varied way. Previous work on this calculus [6] provides primitives to
create new conclaves and logs. Although these operations add to the expressiveness of the calculus they would not
contribute to the description of capability passing processes, so they are omitted here.
We do not have a notion of temporality for capabilities, in the sense that a piece of “evidence” is limited to a certain
duration. There are several ways to add this to the calculus. Probably the easiest method would be to allow conclaves
to issue named credentials, and use certificate revocation lists (CRLs) maintained at conclaves to model credential
expiration or revocation. Use of a credential would require synchronization with the CRL at the conclave to ensure it
was still valid. This would be an approximation to an actual implementation, since in reality there would be a window
of opportunity for attack if a revoked credential were used before the appropriate CRL were received at the use site.
However this is a vulnerability that modern ecommerce appears willing to tolerate. In any case, we choose not to
complicate our calculus with the details of such a scheme.
3. Example: Two-phase commit
In this section we give a concrete example of the lqp-calculus by adding log entries and log rewrite rules for the
well-known and widely deployed two-phase commit protocol [11]. There are five kinds of log entry for two-phase
commit (2PC):
Q ∈ Predicate ::= Submit | Prepared | Admin | Committed | Aborted.
The log rewrite rules for two-phase commit are given in Fig. 5.
A Submit(c) entry in a conclave log for a participant in the 2PC protocol indicates that the conclave is ready to
enter a run of the two-phase commit protocol and uniquely identifies c as the administrator conclave. This is reflected
in the (AT SUBMIT) rule in Fig. 5. The log entry Admin(〈c1, . . . , ck〉) in the log of the administrator conclave records
that the conclaves c1, . . . , ck are the participants in an execution of the two-phase commit protocol. This log entry is
added by the (AT ADMIN) rule. The choice of which conclave will act as the administrator depends on the system
being modelled and will perhaps be chosen by a series of messages exchanged between conclaves (perhaps by a leader
election protocol that is also modelled by log rewrite rules).
When one of the participants has successfully completed its task it enters the Prepared() state, as given by
the (AT PREP) rule. After doing so it can no longer choose to abort. If all the participants become Prepared(),
the administrator may enter the Committed() state, as given by the (AT ADMCMT) rule. This rule represents the
completion of the voting phase of the 2PC protocol. The rule requires a network condition that the administrator
log match the pattern c{{Admin(〈x1, . . . , xn〉)}}, for free participant variables x1, . . . , xn , and that there be log entries
matching the pattern xi {{L yi ∧ Prepared(c)}} for i = 1, . . . , n (and log variables L y1 , . . . , L yn ). The precondition
on the rule requires that each xi be instantiated with the appropriate ci when pattern-matching the network
condition against the actual network. Once the Committed() entry has been added to the administrator log, this
signals to all the other participants that they may also become Committed(). This is given by the (AT PARTCMT)
rule.
A participant in the protocol may choose to abort provided it has not yet entered the Prepared() state, as given by
the (AT STABORT) rule. Since the administrator never enters the Prepared() state, we also add the precondition to this
rule that the conclave not be in the Committed() state, so a committed administrator cannot use the (AT STABORT)
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c{{ε}}, c |= (c0) AtSubmit−−−−−→ Submit(c0) (AT SUBMIT)
c{{ε}} | c1{{Lx1 ∧ Submit(c)}} | . . . | cn{{Lxn ∧ Submit(c)}}, c
|= (c1, . . . , cn) AtAdmin−−−−→ Admin(〈c1, . . . , ck〉)
(AT ADMIN)
c ∈ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉
c{{Submit(c0)}} | c0{{Lx ∧ Admin(〈x1, . . . , xn〉)}}, c |= (c0) AtPrep−−−→ Prepared(c0)
(AT PREP)
Lx 6≡ (L y ∧ Committed()) ∧ Lx 6≡ (L z ∧ Prepared(v))
c{{Lx }}, c |= () AtStAbort−−−−−→ Aborted()
(AT STABORT)
〈x1, . . . , xn〉 = 〈c1, . . . , cn〉
c{{Admin(〈x1, . . . , xn〉)}} | x1{{L y1 ∧ Prepared(c)}} | . . . | xn{{L yn ∧ Prepared(c)}}, c
|= (〈c1, . . . , cn〉) AtAdmCmt−−−−−−→ Committed()
(AT ADMCMT)
c{{Lx ∧ Prepared(c0)}} | c0{{L y ∧ Committed()}}, c |= (c0) AtPartCmt−−−−−→ Committed() (AT PARTCMT)
c{{Lx ∧ Prepared(c0)}} | c0{{L y ∧ Aborted()}}, c |= (c0) AtPartAbt−−−−−→ Aborted() (AT PARTABORT)
Fig. 5. Log rewrite rules for 2PC in the lqp-calculus.
rule to abort. The (AT STABORT) rule allows the administrator to become Aborted() at any time before it decides to
commit. In this case, none of the participants may commit, but must instead choose to abort.
To illustrate the mechanisms introduced above, we give an example using these log rewrite rules. Fig. 6 shows a
network in which three conclaves, cadm, c1 and c2, must either all commit or all abort. A conclave has committed
when, and only when, a commit entry has been written to its log. This reflects the fact that sites may fail during runs
of protocols, and the state of a fault-tolerant system on restarting is given by the contents of the logs.
Once c1 and c2 enter the prepared-to-commit state, the system has the form:
System
∗−→ c1{ logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartCmt; stop
| logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartAbt; stop}
| c1{{Submit(cadm) ∧ Prepared(cadm)}}
| c2{ logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartCmt; stop
| logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartAbt; stop}
| c2{{Submit(cadm) ∧ Prepared(cadm)}}
| cadm{ logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtAdmCmt; stop
| logappend 〈〉 with AtStAbort; stop}
| cadm{{Admin(〈c1, c2〉)}}
where
∗−→ indicates multiple→ reduction.
This completes the first phase of the protocol. At this point the conclaves c1 and c2 cannot abort or commit until
they are notified to do so by the administrator. In the second phase of the protocol, the administrator writes a log entry
signalling that it has decided to commit. The participants c1 and c2 can then commit, so the system evolves to:
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Transi ≡ ci {logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtSubmit;
logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPrep;
( logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartCmt; stop
| logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartAbt; stop ) }
Admin Trans ≡ cadm{logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtAdmin;
( logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtAdmCmt; stop
| logappend 〈〉 with AtStAbort; stop ) }
System ≡ Admin Trans | Trans1 | Trans2 | cadm{{ε}} | c1{{ε}} | c2{{ε}}
Fig. 6. Simple two-phase commit.
System
∗−→ c1{ logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartAbt; stop}
| c1{{Submit(cadm) ∧ Prepared(cadm) ∧ Committed()}}
| c2{ logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPartAbt; stop}
| c2{{Submit(cadm) ∧ Prepared(cadm) ∧ Committed()}}
| cadm{ logappend 〈〉 with AtStAbort; stop}
| cadm{{Admin(〈c1, c2〉) ∧ Committed()}}.
It would also have been possible for the administrator conclave to abort, rather than commit. This would then block
the rule that c1 and c2 are using to try to commit, and so force them to abort.
It is reasonable to ask if this example could be generalized to allow an arbitrary number of participants, rather than
the fixed number n specified by the arity of the argument to the Admin() predicate. This is not possible in the current
calculus because tuples are the only facility for data structuring; however it is straightforward to extend the calculus
with lists to support this.
4. The capability passing system: Implementing protocols
In the setting of global computing it is unrealistic to maintain an environment in which all parties have direct access
to each other’s state. Our answer to this, capabilitypassing processes, replaces the automatic querying of the state of a
remote sites with the exchange of “proof” objects that are evidence for the capabilities of remote sites. Such objects,
which are digitally signed by the conclave that generated them, are effectively a proof of a log entry of a particular
form.
In this section we show how the non-capability passing, log-querying processes (lqp-)calculus can be developed
into a capability passing version: the log-querying capability processes (lqcp-)calculus. Any remote checks required
to make a log change are replaced by the requirement for a certificate. This means that the protocol actions are now
entirely local and all global communication (including the communication of certificates) is modelled by pi-calculus
style actions performed by processes. We extend our domain of values to include these certificates:
v ∈ Value ::= n, a, b, c, . . . | x, y, z, w, . . .
| 〈v1, . . . , vk〉 | Sc[Q(v)].
The new kind of value Sc[Q(v)] signifies a “proof” that the conclave c had the entry Q(v) in its log when this
certificate was signed. As entries cannot be removed from the logs, any conclave that possesses this certificate can
conclude that c currently has the entry Q(v) in its log. We do not address the exact method by which the proof is
signed and verified, we consider this an orthogonal issue that is widely addressed elsewhere.
We alter the logawait and logappend actions and the log rewrite rules so that they only query local storage. Any
remote queries are replaced by a requirement for a certificate, as show in Fig. 7. These rules along with the basic
rules for communication and reduction inside a network environment, from Fig. 4(a), form the full semantics of the
lqcp-calculus.
From the user’s point of view logawait performs the single action of querying a log. However, from the point
of view of an implementation there are two very distinct versions of logawait. Its first use is to check the current
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c{logawait Q(x) as y; P} | c{{L ∧ Q(v)}} −→
c{P[v, Sc[Q(v)]/x, y]} | c{{L ∧ Q(v)}}
(LOGAWAIT-C)
c{logauth c1{{Q(x)}} with Sc1 [Q(v)]; P} −→ c{P[v/x]} (LOGAUTH-C)
c{{L}}, v′ |= (v) rule-name−−−−−→ Q(v0)
c{logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name and 〈v′〉; P} | c{{L}} −→
c{P} | c{{L ∧ Q(v0)}}
(LOGAPPEND-C)
Fig. 7. The Capability Passing rules for the lqcp-calculus.
conclaves local log. The second is to check the log of a remote conclave. Our implementation highlights this distinction
by having local and global forms of logawait.
A local logawait checks its own log and returns a certificate as a result.
c{logawait Q(x) as y; P} | c{{L ∧ Q(v)}}
−→ c{P[v, Sc[Q(v)]/x, y] | c{{L ∧ Q(v)}}. (LOGAWAIT-C)
In addition to unblocking when the specified log entry is found, the variable y is replaced with a certificate that shows
that the specified log entry is present.
There is an implicit assumption that conclaves are always honest when reporting the state of their log. Indeed, this
is an assumption made by most transaction systems. The aim of the protocol is usually to guarantee certain results
in the presence of an outside attacker or the failure of some given sites. However, if some participants were being
dishonest the use of a capability passing system would help to make them accountable by requiring them to sign the
state information they distribute.
We extend the syntax of the calculus with a logauth action. This performs a global version of the logawait action
by using a certificate to query the state of a remote log.
c{logauth c1{{Q(x)}} with Sc1 [Q(v)]; P} −→ c{P[v/x]}. (LOGAUTH-C)
It should be noted that logauth involves a dynamic verification of the signed proof, i.e., the check that the conclave
whose log we wish to check is indeed the conclave that signed the certificate and that the certificate does indeed
contain the required log entry. If this check fails the construct will block indefinitely. This is similar to the way in
which encryption and decryption are handled in the spi-calculus [12].
The old logappend action passed the surrounding environment to the log rewrite rule and in doing so gave it
direct access to all logs. This is exactly the kind of global operation that we wish to avoid. The capability passing
(LOGAPPEND-C) rule only accesses the local log. All the global state information is passed to the log rewrite rules
in the form of certificates (v′ in the following rule) that prove the required remote capabilities.
c{{L}}, v′ |= (v) rule-name−−−−−→ Q(v0)
c{logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name and 〈v′〉; P} | c{{L}} −→
c{P} | c{{L ∧ Q(v0)}}.
(LOGAPPEND-C)
The lqp-calculus uses different log rewrite rules for different transactions. To make the transition to the capability
passing system complete we give a general method that can be used to remove the global checks from any log rewrite
rule.
This removal of the remote checks is key to our approach. It removes the requirement for the operations that are
difficult or (depending on assumptions about the network properties) impossible to implement, i.e., global querying
of state. This removal gives the application layer complete control over the methods used to make communications.
This reduces the need for a bloated trusted computing base.
Recall from Section 2, that the preconditions of log rewrite rules can make three kinds of check. They may check
for the presence of an entry in the local log, they may check for the absence of an entry in the local log or they
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may check for the presence of an entry in a remote log. A rewrite rule is adapted to use capabilities to replace each
remote check. Each such capability provides implementation-level evidence for the success of the remote check that
is performed at the specification level. Therefore a lqcp-calculus rewrite rule is valid if:
(1) any negative test on a log is only applied to the local log, i.e., if there is a precondition of the form L 6≡ LC then
L is a log variable bound by the local log.
(2) All remote queries are performed using certificates.
We define the function certs to find which certificates are needed by a rewrite rule. This function maps to sequences
of certificates, where we denote sequence concatenation by a comma:
certsc(c′{{LC}}) = 〈Sc′ [LC]〉 if c 6= c′
certsc(c′{{L ∧ LC}}) = 〈Sc′ [LC]〉 if c 6= c′
certsc(NC1 | NC2) = certsc(NC1), certsc(NC2)
certsc(NC) = 〈 〉 for all other cases.
This function is parameterized on the name of the local conclave, which is stated by the lqp-calculus log rewrite
rules. Evidence obtained through certificates does not have to be duplicated in the network condition, to remove these
conditions we define bNCcc to be NC with any remote log condition replaced with true.
Using these functions we can map non-capability passing lqp-calculus log rewrite rules to capability passing lqcp-
calculus log rewrite rules:
PC
NC, c |= (v) rule-name−−−−−→ Q(v0)
7→ PC
bNCcc, certsc(NC) |= (v) rule-name−−−−−→ Q(v0)
.
We may now address the syntactic correctness of this mapping:
Lemma 1. The mapping from lqp-calculus log rewrite rules to lqcp-calculus rewrite rules maps valid, closed rules to
valid, closed rules.
Proof. Given a lqp-calculus rewrite rule and its mapping into the lqcp-calculus, the first condition, on negative log
tests, holds for the lqcp-calculus rule as the mapping does not add any log bindings.
The second condition holds because the b cc function removes all remote checks from the network condition.
The mapping removes the remote log variable binders and keeps all the other binders (moving some from the
network condition to the certificates). We know from the first condition on valid rules that these variables cannot be
used for negation checks, and no other form of checks are allowed on log variables. Therefore all names used by the
lqcp-calculus rewrite rule are bound. 
We address the semantic correctness of the mapping in Appendix.
5. Example: Two-phase commit in a capability passing style
We use the two-phase system from Section 3 to illustrate the mapping of lqp-calculus log rewrite rule to lqcp-
calculus log rewrite rule and then to show how lqcp-calculus network reduces.
The (AT PREP) rule is used by a process that is already part of a two-phase commit transaction and wishes to enter
the “prepared to commit” state. The old version of this rule in Fig. 5 checks the local log to ensure that the conclave is
part of a transaction run and then makes a remote check to make sure that the conclave that is playing the part of the
administrator has added the Administrator entry into its own log, including the current transaction as part of the run.
This remote check is removed by the erasure mapping but the certsc function produces a requirement for an equivalent
certificate, to give the following rule:
c ∈ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉
c{{Submit(c0)}}, Sc0 [Admin(〈x1, . . . , xn〉)] |= (c0)
AtPrep−−−→ Prepared(c0)
. (AT PREP-C)
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c{{ε}} |= (c0) AtSubmit−−−−−→ Submit(c0) (AT SUBMIT-C)
c{{ε}}, Sc1 [Submit(c)], . . . , Sck [Submit(c)] |= (c1, . . . , ck) AtAdmin−−−−→ Admin(c1, . . . , ck) (AT ADMIN-C)
c ∈ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉
c{{Submit(c0)}}, Sc0 [Admin(〈x1, . . . , xn〉)] |= (c0)
AtPrep−−−→ Prepared(c0)
(AT PREP-C)
Lx 6≡ (L y ∧ Committed()) ∧ Lx 6≡ (L z ∧ Prepared(v))
c{{Lx }} |= () AtStAbort−−−−−→ Aborted()
(AT STABORT-C)
〈x1, . . . , xn〉 = 〈c1, . . . , cn〉
c{{Admin(x1, . . . , xn)}}, Sv1 [Prepared(c)], . . . , Svn [Prepared(c)]
|= (c1, . . . , cn) AtAdmCmt−−−−−−→ Committed()
(AT ADMCMT-C)
c{{Lx ∧ Prepared(c0)}}, Sc0 [Committed()] |= (c0) AtPartCmt−−−−−→ Committed() (AT PARTCMT-C)
c{{Lx ∧ Prepared(c0)}}, Sc0 [Aborted()] |= (c0) AtPartAbt−−−−−→ Aborted() (AT PARTABORT-C)
Fig. 8. Log rewrite rules for 2PC in the lqcp-calculus.
The (AT ADMIN) rule is used by the administrator conclave to start its run of the two-phase commit protocol. The old
log rewrite rule takes a vector of conclave names and checks that each of those conclaves has recorded the Submit(c)
entry in their log, where c is the name of the administrator. To make the capability passing rule, the check that all of
the participants are submitted is replaced by the requirement for certificates from each of the participants saying that
they are submitted:
c{{ε}}, Sc1 [Submit(c)], . . . , Sck [Submit(c)] |= (c1, . . . , ck) AtAdmin−−−−→ Admin(c1, . . . , ck). (AT ADMIN-C)
We note that it is possible that the local conclave will be included in the tuple c1, . . . , ck . This automatically
generated rule will require a certificate to prove the state of the local log, rather than querying it directly. If we want
to maintain the direct local check we must explicitly state that the log being checked is local.
Another important point to note is that the old rewrite rule implied that all the remote conclaves were checked at
the same time whereas, this new rule only requires possession of all of the certificates in order for the administrator
to proceed. This greatly adds to the flexibility of the system. For instance, if some of the transaction participants
are mobile devices that may enter and leave the administrator’s range, the capability passing system will allow the
administrator to pick up the certificates whenever the participants are in range and commit as soon as it has them all,
rather than waiting, possibly forever, until all the participants are in range at the same time.
The complete capability passing rewrite rules for two-phase commit are presented in Fig. 8. The automatic style
of rule generation means we can produce capability passing log rewrite rules from any log rewrite rules in the lqp-
calculus. In other work [6] we present log rewrite rules for closure, causality and anti-commitment. Using the method
outline in this section we automatically generate capability passing log rewrite rules for these systems.
The capability passing version of the two-phase commit network is giving in Fig. 9. The core actions of both
systems are the same but the capability passing system queries its logs after each logappend action and sends proof
of its state to the other parties. These proof objects are then used as evidence in further logappend actions.
Here, for the sake of clarity, we are assuming that the two participants have direct communication channels to
the administrator. In a more interesting system the certificates would have to be passed through a series of network
obstacles, such as NAT boxes and firewalls.
196 T. Chothia, D. Duggan / Science of Computer Programming 66 (2007) 184–204
Transi ≡ ci {logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtSubmit and 〈〉;
logawait Submit(x) as y;
send outchani !y |
receive inchani?z;
logappend 〈cadm〉 with AtPrep and 〈z〉;
logawait Prepared(cadm) as w;
send outchani !w |
receive inchani?z; ( logappend 〈〉 with AtPartCmt and 〈z〉; stop
| logappend 〈〉 with AtPartAbt and 〈z〉; stop ) }
Admin ≡ cadm{receive outchan1?x; receive outchan2?y;
logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtAdmin and 〈x, y〉;
logawait Admin(x1, x2) as z;
send inchan1!z | send inchan2!z |
receive outchan1?u; receive outchan2?v;
( logappend 〈〉 with AtAdmCmt and 〈u, v〉;
logawait Committed as w; send inchan1!w | send inchan2!w
| logappend 〈〉 with AtStAbort and 〈〉;
logawait Aborted as w; send inchan1!w | send inchan2!w
System ≡ new inchan1; new outchan1; new inchan2; new outchan2;
Admin | Trans1 | Trans2 | cadm{{ε}} | c1{{ε}} | c2{{ε}}
Fig. 9. Simple two-phase commit using proofs.
After the c1 conclave records the Submit entry in its log it uses the local form of logawait to generate a certificate.
c1{ logawait Submit(x) as y;
send outchan1!y |
receive inchan1?z;
. . . } | c1{{Submit(cadm)}}
−→
c1{ send outchan1!Sc1 [Submit(cadm)]
| receive inchan1?z;
. . . } | c1{{Submit(cadm)}}.
This certificate is then sent to the administrator. The other participant, c2, will do the same. This provides the cadm
conclave with the evidence it needs to declare itself the administrator of this run of two-phase commit, which it does
by adding the Admin(c1, c2) entry to its own log:
cadm{ logappend 〈c1, c2〉 with AtAdmin and 〈Sc1 [Submit(cadm)], Sc2 [Submit(cadm)]〉;
logawait Admin(x1, x2) as z;
send inchan1!z | send inchan2!z |
receive outchan1?u; receive outchan2?v; . . .} | cadm{{ε}}
−→
cadm{ logawait Admin(x1, x2) as z;
send inchan1!z | send inchan2!z |
receive outchan1?u; receive outchan2?v; . . .} | cadm{{Admin(c1, c2)}}.
This reduction is performed using the (LOGAPPEND-C) semantic rule from Section 4, which in turn makes use of
the (AT ADMIN-C) log rewrite rule from Fig. 8. The log rewrite rule examines the two certificates and checks that they
do indeed testify that the remote conclaves have submitted to cadm and that they have the correct signatures. These
checks are made dynamically and if they fail the process will block. Here the certificates are correct so the checks are
successful and the conclave continues to reduce. In this simple example, the pattern of adding a log entry, querying
it to get a certificate and then distributing the certificate continues throughout the rest of the reduction. In a more
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realistic system, only certain certificates would be sent to certain conclaves, and each conclave might require different
communication protocols to be used. All of which would be modelled by pi-calculus communications between the
conclaves.
Once Trans1 and Trans2 receive the certificate that proves the cadm conclave is in the Admin state, they both use
it to enter the prepared state. In terms of a run of the two-phase commit protocol, the receipt of the administrator’s
certificate allows the participants to verify that the transaction has been successfully started. When the Trans1 and
Trans2 are ready to commit they may enter the Prepared state. These two conclaves then generate their own certificates
and send them to the administrator, which has now reduced to the following:
cadm{ logappend 〈〉 with AtAdmCmt and 〈Sc1 [Prepared(cadm)], Sc2 [Prepared(cadm)]〉;
logawait Committed as w; send inchan1!w | send inchan2!w
| logappend 〈〉 with AtStAbort and 〈〉;
logawait Aborted as w; send inchan1!w | send inchan2!w }.
As with the example process from Section 3 the administrator has the choice of whether to commit or abort. As this
conclave has Prepared certificates from the other two parts of the transaction it can commit. In doing so it blocks the
logappend action that is attempting to abort. A certificate testifying to this commitment is then produced and sent to
c1 and c2, which use it to commit and reach the networks final state:
System
∗−→ new inchan1; new outchan1; new inchan2; new outchan2;
c1{ logappend 〈〉 with AtPartAbt and 〈Scadm [Committed()]〉; }
c1{{Submit(cadm) ∧ Prepared(cadm) ∧ Committed()}}
c2{ logappend 〈〉 with AtPartAbt and 〈Scadm [Committed()]〉; }
c1{{Submit(cadm) ∧ Prepared(cadm) ∧ Committed()}}
cadm{ logappend 〈〉 with AtStAbort and 〈〉;
logawait Aborted as w; send inchan1!w | send inchan2!w }
| cadm{{Admin(c1, c2) ∧ Committed()}}.
The attempts to abort by c1 and c2 block because the certificate that has been passed to these actions does not prove
the required state for cadm and so the AtStAbort log rewrite rule cannot be applied.
6. An example of a Java API
To demonstrate how our approach may be realized, we provide an example of two API in a hypothetical extension
of the Java programming language. The first makes remote communications to check the state of other parties and the
second uses capabilities to avoid these calls.
The API, in Fig. 10 uses a hypothetical extension of Java with the abstraction of logs. A log is composed of
propositions formed from a set of application-specific predicates. The abstract class Predicate is used as a base
class for log predicates. We attach a signature field to all predicates, and operations for digital signing and authentic
(the details of these operations will depend on the state of the predicate). The constructor requires the log manager for
the log to which the log entry is being added, and the private key of the log manager is used for signing purposes.
The local state for global coordination is represented by a log, manipulated by a log manager. A log manager has a
set of operations for appending to the logs. Each such operation represents a step in a protocol for global agreement.
Each such operation requires some conditions of the global state, represented by both local log entries and by log
entries at remote sites.
The base class for log managers is given by the LogManager abstract class. This includes a field for the private
signing key of the log manager, and this field is used for signing purposes, as explained above. For the 2PC example,
we define the LogManager2PC concrete class. This defines a subclass Predicate2PC as a subclass of Predicate,
that adds a transaction identifier that all transactions in a run of 2PC can use to identify each other. The predicates for
the 2PC protocol are then defined as base classes from this: Committed, Aborted, Administrator and Prepared.
We elides the details of the specialization of the sign and signedBy methods for these classes.
The LogManager2PC class defines methods for each one of the log append rules for the 2PC example. Each one
of these operations adds a new entry to the local log, with some set of preconditions that check both local and remote
logs.
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public abstract class Predicate {
protected Signature sig;
public Predicate (LogManager lm) { sig = this.sign(lm.key); }
protected abstract void sign (PrivateKey k);
public abstract boolean signedBy (PublicKey k);
}
public abstract class LogManager {
PrivateKey key;
protected void logappend (Predicate p) { ... }
public Predicate logawait (PredicatePattern p) { ... }
}
public class LogManager2PC extends LogManager {
abstract class Predicate2PC extends Predicate { TransID tid; }
final class Committed extends Predicate2PC { ... }
final class Aborted extends Predicate2PC { ... }
final class Administrator extends Predicate2PC {
Set〈TransID〉 participants; ...
}




public void AtAdmCmt () {
requires: the executing transaction has an Administrator log entry
all transactions listed as participants have Prepared log entries
this.logappend (new Committed (this));
}
public void AtPartCmt () {
requires: the executing transaction has a Prepared log entry
the administrator transaction has a Committed log entry
this.logappend (new Committed (this));
}
public void AtPartAbt () {
requires: the executing transaction has a Prepared log entry
the administrator transaction has an Aborted log entry
this.logappend (new Aborted (this));
}
}
Fig. 10. Example of log-based API in Java.
Although much of the abstraction of logs can be added using class libraries, the example also assumes an extension
of Java with a requires clause. This specifies the preconditions for each logappend operation. In this example, we
write these preconditions in informal English, for the sake of brevity. In reality the query language could be made
more explicit using a development similar to that of network conditions NC and preconditions PC in Section 2.
The preconditions for the log append operations make non-local reference to the logs of other log managers. For
example, the AtAdmCmt operation, which is executed by the administrator, must check that all of the participants have
added Prepared entries to their logs. We allow this at the specification level. At the implementation level, we remove
these non-local checks by extending the methods to require extra arguments. These arguments in turn represent explicit
evidence of the remote state that is a precondition for a log append operation to fire. We give this version of the Java
interface in Section 5.
Fig. 11 continues the example from Fig. 10, replacing the remote log querying in the log-changing operations
with extra arguments that represent “evidence” for log entries at remote sites. For example, a participant will accept a
proof of type Committed, i.e., a proof that the administrator has decided to commit the transaction, provided that the
proof can be authenticated and that this is a proof that the administrator for this run of 2PC has committed. Since the
mechanisms for trust management and authentication are orthogonal to our concerns, we leave the signature checking
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public class LogManager2PC extends LogManager {
abstract class Predicate2PC extends Predicate { TransID tid; }
final class Committed extends Predicate2PC { ... }
final class Aborted extends Predicate2PC { ... }
final class Administrator extends Predicate2PC {
Set〈TransID〉 participants; ...
}




public void AtAdmCmt (Set〈Prepared〉 proofs) {
requires: the executing transaction has an Administrator log entry
proofs show: all transactions listed as participants
have Prepared log entries
this.logappend (new Committed (this));
}
public void AtPartCmt (Committed proof) {
requires: the executing transaction has a Prepared log entry
proof shows: the administrator transaction has a Committed log entry
this.logappend (new Committed (this));
}
}
Fig. 11. Example of log-based API in Java.
out of the checking out of preconditions. We only assume that proofs are accepted as coming from the administrator
if they are signed by the private key corresponding to the public key trustedKey. We may also perform some
precondition checking before performing the log append rule, as a basic sanity check or for detection of a replay
attack, to anticipate potential log append failures. In the following example, we check the signature of the proof and
then that this is from the administrator in the current run of 2PC:






Committed pf = chan.receive();
// Authenticate that the proof is signed by a trusted party
if (pf.signedBy(trustedKey))




LawGoverned Internet Communities [13] are similar to networks in our lqp-calculus. Agents may join a community
that is governed by a given law by connecting to any one of a number of trusted controllers and specifying the law.
These controllers record a state for each agent and only allow this state to be modified in accordance with given laws,
which may require the controller to make remote checks to other controllers of other agents. Requiring the trusted
controllers to make remote communication, while not giving the programmer access to the controller’s code, may limit
the places in which controllers can be placed. We could adapt Law Governed Internet Communities to use capability
passing processes by altering the controllers to only communicate with the agents they manage. The need for direct
communication between controllers could be replaced by having agents pass signed credentials as capabilities between
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controllers. Hence we would move the need to navigate firewalls and network address translators out of the trusted
code of the controllers and into the hands of the agent.
Omicini et al. propose Tuple Centers with role-based access control [14,15] as a model for agent coordination.
This is an extension of tuple spaces that only allows tuples to be altered in accordance with specific rules. Here the
tuple spaces are similar to the logs of the lqp-calculus and the access restrictions and rules that allow the tuple space
to be altered are similar to our log rewrite rules. Omicini et al. do not consider how tuple centers could be effectively
be distributed. Our approach suggests altering the tuple centers to issue and require signed capabilities, as we have
described in this paper.
Berger and Honda [16] have developed a calculus to model two-phase commit. The calculus we present here is a
framework that can be used to model a range of agreement protocols, of which two-phase commit is one example, as
we have shown in previous work [6].
Transactions and atomic commitment can be implemented in distributed programming languages, and therefore
in calculi that are intended to be “kernel languages” for distributed programming. Bruni et al. [17] give an
implementation of distributed transactions in the join-calculus, using an original atomic commitment protocol. Busi
et al. [18] propose a formal modelling of transactions in JavaSpaces based on process-calculi techniques. The focus
of these efforts is different from the work presented here, which proposes an architecture and programming model for
building global agreement protocols in global computing environments. We have deliberately omitted any mention of
failure models [19–21], since they are orthogonal to the issues addressed in this paper. An application developer can
use the approach presented here with any failure model and any protocol correctness conditions that they consider
appropriate to their particular application.
Numerous process algebras have been proposed as the foundations of programming languages for network
applications. Most of this work is based on mobile computation and mobile code to deal with latency and firewall
problems [22–26]. Much of this work has focused on access control of mobile computation in networks, as well
as tracking the trustworthiness of hosts. Our focus is on global agreement aspects of distributed computing. Walker
[27] describes a type system that statically verifies that a program satisfies a security policy specified by a security
automaton [28], essentially a Bu¨chi automaton for specifying safety properties. States of the automaton are represented
by type-level objects with term-level witnesses, somewhat analogous to the treatment of log predicates in lqcp.
However the approaches are somewhat different in their objectives overall and mechanisms. For example we restrict
our concern to stable predicates to avoid problems with certificate revocation. Encapsulating witnesses and principals
in packets is fairly fundamental to our approach, both for transmitting proofs over insecure channels, and also because
in many instances it is necessary to give homogeneous types for sets of proofs.
In the distributed systems community there has been work on certificate-based transactions. These systems use
certificates to prove identity or authorship, whereas we are proposing the use of certificates to allow the agreement
parts of a protocol to be modelled separately from the communication aspects. Previous work has also investigated
techniques for the secure transmission of causal relationships in a distributed system [29,30], and for securing
multicast communications [31,32]. The latter work is largely orthogonal to the work considered here, and the former
work focuses on using authentication techniques to prevent the forgery of vector clocks that carry causality information
in distributed communications. This is targeted at a lower level than the work presented here. DeLine and Fa¨hndrich
have developed the Vault programming language [33], in which it is possible to statically enforce the correctness of
protocols by type checking. The consideration we present here, of a global network programming language that uses
proofs of capability to run secure state protocols over a potentially insecure communication system, appears to be
novel.
8. Conclusions
Our approach to implementing global agreement for distributed protocols is based on a notion of digitally signed
“proofs of capability” transmitted between network sites. This approach has the benefit of moving a large part of
the implementation of the atomic commitment protocol outside the trusted computing base. In particular, none of the
primitive operations of the protocol predefine the way in which communications are made. This choice is instead left
to the application while the system ensures the correct execution of the protocol.
This paper does not consider the privacy aspects of conclaves giving out signed proofs of their current state.
Encrypting the certificates would protect this information. To avoid pushing this into the protocol layer a typed
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versions of these proofs could be transmitted safely over insecure networks using cryptographic types [34]. Other
further work would be to implement a capability passing transaction system as an extension of an already existing
package. Maftia [35] and the Java-based Jini system [36] are possibilities.
Appendix. Correctness of capability passing systems
Capability passing processes provide an implementation method for systems that wish to query the state of
remote parties. It is natural to ask: in what sense is this implementation “correct”? We certainly do not expect a
direct relationship between actions of a capability passing process (in the lqcp-calculus) and those of a non-capability
passing process (in the lqp-calculus), as capability passing processes will perform a variety of actions that are aimed
at passing certificates between conclaves. Instead we show that properties that are based solely on the logs of a system
and are preserved by reduction in the original system are also preserved in the capability passing system. An example
of this kind of judgement on logs is presented in previous work [6] where we define a consistency property on networks
that states a range of requirements, such as a log cannot be committed and aborted at the same time.
We start this section by defining supported networks to be networks with log entries for every certificate. We then
show that log alterations in capability passing, supported networks can be mimicked by similar reductions in non-
capability passing networks. Next we formally define what it means for a judgement to be based solely on the logs of
a network and finally we prove the judgement correspondence result between the calculi in both directions.
Definition 2. A network is supported in the lqcp-calculus, if there exists a log entry for every certificate, i.e.,
sup(N) if and only if for all c, Q, v such that Sc[Q(v)] is a value in N , there exists a context C such that
N = C[c{{· · · ∧ Q(v) ∧ . . .}}].
As would be expected, this well-formedness property is preserved by reduction:
Lemma 3. In the lqcp-calculus, with any set of log rewrite rules, supported networks reduce to supported networks:
if sup(N ) and N −→ N ′ then sup(N ′).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the reduction from N to N ′. The only step case is the congruence rule; correctness
follows directly from the induction hypothesis. As log entries cannot be removed, the reduction rules that do not
generate certificates also follow trivially. This leaves the (LOGAWAIT-C) rule and as this requires the presence of an
actual log entry in order to generate a certificate for it, the proof holds. 
The capability passing semantics can only alter logs in the same way as the non-capability passing semantics. In
order to state this formally we define logs(N ) to be the erasure mapping of any network to just its logs.
Definition 4. For any network N we define logs(N ) by:
logs(N1 | N2) = logs(N1) | logs(N2) logs(new n; N ) = new n; logs(N )
logs(c{P}) = c{stop} logs(c{{L}}) = c{{L}}.
We note that for any lqp-calculus or lqcp-calculus network, the logs of that network are a valid network term for
both calculi. Next we show that any log change that can be made by the capability passing lqcp-calculus can also be
made by the non-capability passing lqp-calculus.
Lemma 5. Assume we have a set of lqp-calculus rewrite rules and their lqcp-calculus versions, and a supported,
capability passing lqcp-calculus network N such that N −→ N ′ using the lqcp-calculus rewrite rules.
It follows that there exists a non-capability passing lqp-calculus network M, which does not contain any logs and
new a1, . . . , an; NL ≡ logs(N ) such that new a1, . . . , an; (NL | M) −→ M ′ using only the non-capability passing
semantics and logs(N ′) ≡ logs(M ′).
Proof. If the reduction from N to N ′ does not alter any logs our lemma is trivially true, with M = c{stop}. That
leaves reductions made using the congruence and (LOGAPPEND-C) rules. For this type of reduction to be made we
must have:
N ≡ new a1, . . . , an; (c{logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name and 〈certs〉; P} | N1)
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Fig. A.1. Proof structure.
for some a1, . . . , an, v, P, N1 and where c is the conclave whose log has been extended and rule-name is the log
rewrite rule used to make the alteration in the network N .
The network N is a supported network, so we know that actual log entries exist for each certificate. M is inside the
binders for any bound names that may occur in the logs and therefore has access to them. As the network condition
of the lqcp-calculus rewrite rule was derived from the lqp-calculus rewrite rule using the erasure function we know
that the presence of log entries for each certificate is enough to ensure that the network condition on the lqp-calculus
rewrite rule will hold. Therefore any logappend action that could be made using a capability passing log rewrite rule
could also be made by the original log rewrite rule, using the non-capability passing semantics. Hence we set
M = c{logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name; P}. 
This lemma is analogous to saying that, when using the capability passing lqcp-calculus, an attacker cannot force
us to make a change in our logs that is not also possible in the non-capability passing process with its perfect
communication. Hence, if it is possible for an attacker to affect a system it has nothing to do with using a capability
passing style.
The kind of judgements we are interested in are those based solely on logs. We formally define this class of
properties as follows.
Definition 6. A judgement on networks ` in either the lqp-calculus or the lqcp-calculus is based solely on logs if:
(1) ` logs(N ) if and only if ` N
and (2) ` N and N ≡ M implies ` M .
We can now prove our main result that a judgement based on logs that is preserved by reduction in the non-
capability passing calculus is also preserved by reduction of supported networks in the capability passing calculus:
Theorem 7. Any judgement ` that is based solely on logs and is preserved by reduction in the non-capability passing
lqp-calculus, with a given set of log rewrite rules, is also preserved by reduction in the lqcp-calculus, using the
capability passing versions of the log rewrite rules.
Proof. The structure of the proof is provided in Fig. A.1. Assume we have a lqcp-calculus process N such that
` N and N → N ′. By Lemma 5, we know that logs(N ) ≡ new a1, . . . , an; NL and that there exists a non-
capability passing network M , which does not contain any logs, such that new a1, . . . , an; (NL | M) −→ M ′ and
logs(N ′) = logs(M ′). We may then make the following deductions:
` N by assumption
` logs(N ) by the definition of `
` logs(new a1, . . . , an; NL) as logs(new a1, . . . , an; NL) ≡ logs(N )
` logs(new a1, . . . , an; (NL | M)) as M does not contain any logs.
` new a1, . . . , an; (NL | M) by the definition of `
` M ′ by preservation of ` in the lqp-calculus
` logs(M ′) by the definition of `
` logs(N ′) as logs(N ′) = logs(M ′)
` N ′ by the definition of `. 
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Along with Lemma 5, which proves a progress result, this theorem shows the correctness of capability passing
processes. We can also show that the capability passing lqcp-calculus is no more restrictive than the lqp-calculus by
showing that the judgements that are persevered in the lqcp-calculus are also preserved in the lqp-calculus. First we
prove the reverse of Lemma 5:
Lemma 8. Assume we have a set of lqp-calculus rewrite rules and their lqcp-calculus versions, and a supported,
non-capability passing lqp-calculus network N such that N −→ N ′ using the lqp-calculus rewrite rules.
It follows that there exists a capability passing lqcp-calculus network M, which does not contain any logs and
new a1, . . . , an; NL ≡ logs(N ) such that
new a1, . . . , an; (NL | M) −→ M ′
using only the capability passing semantics and logs(N ′) ≡ logs(M ′).
Proof. If the reduction from N to N ′ does not alter any logs our lemma is trivially true, with M = c{stop}. That
leaves reductions made using the congruence and (LOGAPPEND) rules. For this type of reduction to be made we must
have:
N ≡ new a1, . . . , an; (c{logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name; P} | N1)
for some a1, . . . , an, v, P, N1 and where c is the conclave whose log has been extended and rule-name is the log
rewrite rule used to make the alteration in the network N .
The network condition of the lqcp-calculus rewrite rule is the erasure mapping of the network condition of the
lqp-calculus rewrite rule, therefore if the lqp-calculus network condition holds then we know that the lqcp-calculus
network condition must also hold. Furthermore as the certs function selects rules from the network condition and as the
lqp-calculus rewrite rule holds, we know that log entries exist for each of the certificates required by the lqcp-calculus
rewrite rule.
Let Sci [Qi (vi )] for i = 1..n be the certificates required by the lqcp-calculus rewrite rule and let Ci =
ci {logawait Qi (x) as y; send ai !y} for a new channel ai . Now let:
M = C1 | · · · | Cn | c{receive a1?z1; . . . receive an?zn;
logappend 〈v〉 with rule-name and 〈z1, . . . , zn〉; P}.
As the necessary log entries exist the logawait actions can generate the necessary certificates and so the logappend
action can succeed. 
Finally, we prove the counterpart of Theorem 7:
Theorem 9. Any judgement ` that is based solely on logs and is preserved, for supported networks, by reduction in
the capability passing lqcp-calculus, with the capability passing versions of some log rewrite rules, is also preserved
by reduction in the lqp-calculus, using the original version of the rewrite rules.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 7, but using Lemma 8 rather than Lemma 5. 
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